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BRICS IN TRADE CLUSTERS: THE PROSPECTS OF CONVERGENT 
TRADE POLICIES OF LARGE EMERGING ECONOMIES
This paper analyzes global trading clusters to understand the effects of the BRICS economic rise for 
the international trading system and the WTO. The BRICS dominate without doubt their regions in 
economic and trade figures, as well as compete with — and in the case of China even overtake — the 
G7-states on the global level. But do the BRICS share a common approach for international trade, 
which they could promote as an alternative order or challenge to the current international trading 
system? So far the consequences of the BRICS-rising for international trade structures, multilateral 
negotiations and the WTO remain uncertain.
This paper argues on the basis of cluster analysis, that — due to their respective trade patterns — 
the rise of the BRICS will not lead to major changes inside the WTO. By testing emerging economies 
on different trade variables, the paper shows the challenges for BRICS cooperation in international 
trade and reveals also false assumptions in the respective literature. The differences between emerging 
economies are sometimes much bigger than assumed, which makes cooperation rather complicated 
and complex. The paper concludes that the WTO remains in its current form the most important trade 
governance institution for emerging economies, because the divergence in their trade patterns hinders 
emerging economies to challenge the current system with an alternative approach. Refs 28. Tables 2.
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БРИКС В ТОРГОВЫХ КЛАСТЕРАХ
В статье анализируются глобальные торговые кластеры для того, чтобы иметь представ-
ление о  последствиях экономического подъема стран БРИКС для международной торговой 
системы и ВТО. Страны БРИКС, без сомнения, доминируют в своих регионах в экономиче-
ских и торговых оценках, а также конкурируют с государствами «Большой семерки» (G7) на 
глобальном уровне, а Китай даже обгоняет их. Но разделяют ли страны БРИКС общий подход 
к международной торговле, который можно было бы продвигать в качестве альтернативного 
порядка или вызова текущей международной торговой системе? До сих пор последствия роста 
БРИКС для международных торговых структур, многосторонних переговоров и ВТО остаются 
неопределенными.
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В исследовании на основе кластерного анализа утверждается, что рост БРИКС не приве-
дет к серьезным изменениям внутри ВТО из-за индивидуальных структур торговли членов — 
стран БРИКС. Тестируя страны с развивающейся экономикой на различных торговых пере-
менных, рeзультат показывает наличие проблем для сотрудничества БРИКС в международной 
торговле, а  также ложные предположения на данную тему в  соответствующей литературе. 
Различия между формирующимися рыночными экономиками иногда намного больше, чем 
предполагалось, что делает сотрудничество довольно сложным в комплексе. В статье делает-
ся вывод о  том, что ВТО в  cвоей нынешней форме остается наиболее важным институтом 
управления торговлей для стран с развивающейся экономикой, поскольку расхождение в их 
структурах торговли мешает странам БРИКС бросить вызов системе, используя альтернатив-
ный подход. Библиогр. 28. Ил. 10. Табл. 2.
Ключевые слова: БРИКС, ВТО, международная торговля, кластерный анализ, страны с раз-
вивающейся экономикой.
Introduction
Emerging economies play today a significant role in international trade as well as in 
the academic and political debates about the future developments of the global trading 
system. Their relatively high growth rates over the last decade, combined with a deepen-
ing integration in global production chains and profit promising investment opportuni-
ties, have made them a core interests for economic and political elites. Western countries 
realized, that the rise of emerging economies might imply challenges for Western indus-
tries and international economic institutions by a transformation of the global economic 
order. Yet, emerging economies themselves gained self-confidence and ambitions, caused 
by their economic growth. One product of these developments is the formation of the 
BRICS Dialogue Forum, which can be understood as an alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa, in order to promote global redistribution and recognition [Nel, 
2010], in line with their mutual cooperation.
Out of all the emerging economies, the BRICS qualifies especially for this analysis, 
since the BRICS have emerged, out of the purely abstract notion, towards a dialogue forum, 
which is slowly but constantly promoting various forms of cooperation. Other emerging 
powers groupings are not considered here, because their level of cooperation is less fre-
quent and less increasing. Founded as a catchy investment phrase from Goldman Sachs’ 
Jim O’Neil in 2001, the BRIC(S) have met for the first time during the global financial 
crisis in 2008, and are holding annually head-of-state summits since 2009. Furthermore 
the countries hold regularly meetings of their trade ministers, either as part of the annual 
summits, or during WTO summits. Intra-BRICS trade, as well as global trade, is discussed 
in the BRICS’ Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI), and under the 
Trade and Investment Cooperation Frameworks [BRICS, 2013]. Those events do not only 
justify the academic engagement with the group, but also show the relevance of analyzing 
the prospects of this cooperation. So far little tangible outcome has been achieved in those 
meetings and frameworks on international trade cooperation, either because the work is 
still in process, or because they actually struggle to find a common ground or consensus in 
international trade issues. According to a study on commitment compliance of the BRICS 
to their summit declarations, trade has with only 55 % compliance the second lowest score 
of 16 fields of cooperation. In comparison, overall the BRICS show a compliance of 72 % 
with their commitments [BRICS Research Group, 2016]. The present paper is giving a 
detailed analyzes of those prospects and areas of cooperation.
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This paper aims to investigate the foundations of potential BRICS trade cooperation 
and coordination. The main question is, if the BRICS have a combined economic interests 
in international trade, which they can promote and embed in the international trading 
system together as a bloc. To uncover this, the paper uses cluster analysis in order to 
group the WTO member states according to different trade variables. These clusters help 
us to understand, if the BRICS — in comparison to other WTO member states — share a 
specific pattern, which could be understood as a BRICS characteristic, and provide a basis 
for deeper cooperation.
Based on rational-choice theory we can assume that countries have individual prefer-
ences, and act according to their restrictions and expected utility maximization. Therefore 
countries should prefer those trade policies, which are most beneficial for their national 
economic interest. Simultaneously, it would be highly unlikely that countries support 
trade policies, which contradict their own preferences. We can assume for the specific case 
of BRICS cooperation in international trade, that if there are shared preferences, reflected 
in their trade patterns, the members of the group would try to cooperate in respective 
areas and try to carry out these policies also in international institutions. However, if this 
is not the case, cooperation will be more complicated or absent. 
In a first section, this paper discusses the relevant theoretical approaches. Simple 
Rational-Choice Theory is the basis for the logic of argumentation. Next to this, the ap-
proach of State-Permeated Market Economies is discussed [Nölke et al., 2015], which of-
fers an economic categorization for large emerging economies — as the BRICS — and 
gives an overview of patterns, which differentiate the BRICS from other forms of market 
economies. 
The following section provides the necessary background on BRICS internal and 
global trade developments over the last decade, with a focus on the importance of inter-
BRICS trade. Furthermore the section discusses the roles of emerging economies in cur-
rent developments in the international trading system, as for example mega-regional trade 
agreements. In doing so, it also provides the basis for the subsequent analysis. 
Next up is a cluster analysis, based on self-organizing maps. After introducing the 
method itself and its methodology, different trade clusters are presented, which show the 
similarities and differences of the BRICS in their international trade patterns. Those clus-
ters include nearly all of the WTO member states and group those into four defined clus-
ters based on seven trade variables. The main findings and an outlook conclude this paper 
in the last section. 
1. Emerging Economies in International Trade: Theoretical Approach 
The developments around the BRICS touch two theoretical debates on the world 
economy, firstly the question about the behavior of countries, and secondly the debate of 
economic preferences of emerging economies. This section discusses the first question 
from a rational choice theory perspective, and the second within the context of different 
concepts about the economic preferences of emerging economies. 
Rational Choice Theory offers a theoretical approach to explain how countries make 
decisions and how they act under different circumstances — for example different scopes 
of knowledge or under uncertainty. It has become one major theory of Economics as well 
as for Social Science in general. Rational choice is defined as the process of determining 
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what options are available, and choosing the most preferred option according to some 
consistent criteria [Levin & Milgrom, 2004]. Rational choice theory is therefore an op-
timization-based approach, or in other words a utility maximization approach. Of cause 
this approach has also caused much criticism, especially in social science, and maybe most 
prominently by Amartya Sen for its simplistic explanations, its biased character and its 
behaviorism [Sen, 1973; 1977]. However, few other theories offer such a precise and con-
vertible set of tools for the empirical research of decision making as rational choice theory. 
Reflecting the aim of this paper to actually produce empiric output, it should be obvious 
that an intensive social study of the different underlying social patterns of decision mak-
ing in the respective countries is not only close to impossible, it is also simply unnecessary 
for the search of shared preferences of large emerging economies.
The approach is based on the idea that actors have preferences and choose their deci-
sions according to those. There are three main assumptions about the behavior of actors 
in decision making situation [Bamberg et al., 2008, p.143]. The first is the preference as-
sumption, that actors have the choice between different courses of action, and rank those 
according to their individual preferences, in order to reach their ultimate action. The sec-
ond is the restriction assumptions, which determines the decision making of the actor not 
only by ones preferences, but also by restrictions to act. And the third is the maximization 
assumption, which assumes that actors will always chose the preference, which under the 
present restrictions will lead to the best result. One main problem with the rational choice 
theory is the available information for the actors. In often idealized experiments actors 
have full information about the different outcomes, restrictions and possibilities of ac-
tion. However, in real life the situation differs from the idealized experiment — this has 
become one of the main critiques for rational choice [Schmitt, 1996, p. 106]. Actors do 
neither have full information about situations, nor does utility maximization apply in all 
social situations as the main preference. Actors also act according to social patterns, as for 
example values or group dynamics. 
For this paper, rational choice implies that countries make decisions according to 
their individual preferences and restrictions in order to achieve utility maximization. 
This applies to developed economies in the same manner as to emerging economies. This 
means that the individual preferences and economic policies of emerging economies can 
be determined by the structural economic situations of the respective country. Or very 
simplified: the current trade patterns of emerging economies determine their decision 
making in international trade cooperation. Of cause a couple of other factors affect this 
coherence, and there are differentiations between narrower and wider conceptions of ra-
tional choice theory [Bamberg et. al., 2008, p. 144; Opp, 1999]. However, for this analysis it 
is necessary to simply understand the interacting coherence between domestic economic 
structures and national preferences, because domestic structures are crucial for explaining 
a countries foreign policy preferences [Waltz, 1959].
This leads to the question about what are the economic preferences of emerging 
economies. Andereas Nölke, Tobias ten Brink, Simone Claar and Christian May have de-
veloped a market economy categorization [Nölke et al., 2015] for the BIC countries (Bra-
zil, India and China). However, even if the authors suggest that Russia and South Africa 
are not their first choice for this categorization, we still can assume that the implications 
of this approach for emerging economies affects also all BRICS, not only because the three 
example countries are already included, but also because Russia and South Africa show 
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many pattern which come close to the ideal type categorization of the authors. Their aim 
of the authors was to determine a common institutional categorization for large emerging 
economies, which makes them distinguishable from other categorization, and to develop 
an Political Economy approach for the mainly International Relations debate about the ef-
fects of emerging powers on the global order [Ikenberry, 2008; Schweller, 2011; Johnston, 
2007]. 
Here lies the relevance of the present approach of the authors. In order to understand 
the effects of emerging powers or emerging economies on the global order or interna-
tional institutions, we first need to understand the internal structures of those countries. 
Just drawing the differences on governmental statements or assumed cultural differences 
is not enough. It is of significant necessity to understand the internal socio-economic 
patterns of countries in order to understand their international politics, of which interna-
tional trade policies are a part of. Of cause emerging economies are themselves extremely 
different from each other. However, they also share patterns, which makes them as a group 
distinguishable from other groups of countries — by showing this, the authors have pro-
duced a valuable contribution to the current discourses.
This categorization of state-permeated market economies (SPMEs1) is determined by 
the assumption that the state, driven by strong pro-business support for national develop-
ment, has a more important role than in OECD economies [Nölke et al., 2015, p. 543]. It 
takes as a starting point a reciprocal mechanisms of loyalty and trust between the mem-
bers of this state-business coalitions, based on informal personal relations, family ties and 
shared social backgrounds. Generally speaking, this state-capitalist categorization should 
be differentiated from three other categorization: first the liberal market economies 
(LMEs) where capitalism is coordinated by the market and formal contacts, secondly the 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) with capitalism coordination through formalized 
networks and associations, and thirdly dependent market economies (DMEs) where capi-
talism is organized by hierarchies within multinational enterprises [Nölke et. al., 2015].
This state driven capitalism of SPMEs should not be understood as closed approach, 
since countries are always different is certain patterns, but has to be understood as a gen-
eral tendency in contrast to the other forms of capitalism. SPMEs have similarities in five 
main economic governance patterns: corporate governance, corporate finance, labor rela-
tions, innovation, and domestic as well as international integration. In SPME most major 
companies are dominated by national capital and controlled by well-connected families 
or the state. They mainly raise investment through internal savings and loans by national 
banks, or enjoy preferential financial support by the state. SPMEs relay on a low wage 
regime, arranged and preserved by state institutions through the segmentation of labor 
forces into well-protected sectors, less-protected sectors and an informal sector. Further-
more, SPMEs hold relatively weak patent right systems, while innovation is mainly exclu-
sively supported in state selected sectors. Finally the growth of SPMEs is also based on 
large domestic markets, in which sectors grow under the protected of the state. 
All those patterns constitute a state-driven capitalism, which diverges in certain fac-
tors from the Western forms of capitalism. It explains that the national interest in SPMEs 
is mainly defined by the interests of the major companies and elites, and not by the general 
1 The Authors themselves use the term SME, but in order to avoid confusion with the acronym SME 
for ‘Small and Medium-sized Enterprises’, this paper uses the acronym SPME for State-Permeated Market 
Economies.
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welfare of the population. Even if this might apply also in other forms of capitalism, the 
authors differentiate between much closer ties between the business elites and the govern-
ments in SPMEs in comparison with a lesser degree of state-business interdependencies 
in other forms of capitalism. In SPMEs the states duty to seek for general welfare of the 
populations dismantles under the business elites desire to preserve their benefits and posi-
tions. Furthermore, the state is — by its close ties to the business elites — in the constant 
position of preserving national company’s interest on the international level through pro-
tectionist policies. While in many Western countries multinational companies promote 
the reduction of protectionism, the for emerging economies so important state-run in-
dustries, which are based also on large domestic markets, urge the state to protect them — 
also in order to keep benefit flows running between the business and state elites. The 
focus lies here on the involvement of the government of large emerging economies in the 
domestic economy, in comparison with other countries, and therefore participates in the 
debate about the Washington and the Beijing Consensus [Chin & Thakur, 2010].
For this paper the conception of SPMEs provides a theoretical possibility to look for 
common interests in trade policies. It offers an explanation why emerging economies with 
very different trade patterns and varying national interests might still agree on a shared vi-
sion for the regulation of the international trading system. This vision, however, is not the 
attempt to reform or progressively influence of the current system, but emphasize a slower 
liberalization and to preserve the status quo of the WTO, for example against progres-
sive (mega-) regional trade agreements. The link between the SPME categorization and 
rational choice theory is manifested in their common use of rationality for state behavior. 
In contrast to constructivist approaches in social science, rational choice theory offers the 
possibility to compare government decision making of countries with different domestic 
systems, but some common features. Furthermore the approach allows to focus on spe-
cific areas of government decision making, without the necessity to explain every course 
of action of the state. Therefore rational choice offers the ideal foundation to enlarge the 
SPME categorization, and use it to find common pattern between the BRICS. The next 
section uses this foundation and looks at the status quo of BRICS Trade.
2. Challenges of Intra-BRICS and Extra-BRICS Trade
As a group, the BRIC heads of state met for the first time officially in 2009 in Yekat-
erinburg, subsequently after the establishment of the G20 in 2008. In their relatively short 
joint statement they simply emphasized the importance of international trade, urged for 
stability of the multilateral trading system, and pushed for comprehensive and balanced 
results in the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda [BRIC, 2009]. In their joint statement 
in 2010 we can observe a development in BRIC cooperation in trade issues. The BRIC 
were discussing the modalities of cooperation in trade issues, for example a local currency 
trade settlement agreement. Furthermore they stronger than before urged all states to 
resist all forms of trade protectionism and to fight restrictions to trade [BRIC, 2010]. This 
narratives are continuing in the next joint statements and declarations of the following 
summits. The BRICS are more and more emphasizing cooperation in trade between each 
other in line with the international trading system, which is in their view only provided 
by a stable WTO. Furthermore, all subsequent joint documents called for the reduction of 
trade barriers of trade protectionism. 
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However, if we take a look at the development of BRICS trade liberalization since the 
establishment of their dialogue forum, we can observe increasing protectionism of those 
emerging economies, and interestingly especially between each other. Simon J. Evenett 
called therefore for a rethink of the current BRICS trade strategies [Evenett, 2015, p. 11]. 
He found out that the BRICS have implemented 1196  harmful trade measures against 
each other since the crisis in 2008. This means that the BRICS themselves are responsible 
for 32 % or all harmful trade measures against the BRICS, while the G7 and Australia are 
only responsible for 20 % [Evenett, 2015, p. 4]. In the light of this data, the BRICS state-
ments regarding the abolishment of protectionism and the reduction of trade barriers 
seem odd. However, the actual situation is still in line with Ian Bremmers and Nouriel 
Roubinis essay about a G-Zero world, in which trade and economic negotiations of the 
next 20 years will be driven rather by competition and protectionism, than by cooperation 
and liberalization [Bremmer & Roubini, 2011, p. 4].
Regarding regional or mega-regional trade integration outside of the WTO the BRICS 
have also a mixed record. Russia is a members of the Eurasian Economic Union. South 
Africa is member of the Southern African Customs Union, Brazil member of the Customs 
Union of Mercosur, and India is part of the South Asian Free Trade Area. China is so far 
not a member of any institutionalized form of economic integration, the country is until 
now focusing on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Currently Beijing “has 19 FTAs under 
construction, among which 14 Agreements have been signed and implemented already” 
[MOFCOM PR China, 2016].
Currently mega-regional trade agreements are on top of the international trade agen-
da, especially the implementation process and the effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are widely dis-
cussed. Out of frustration about the slow developments in the WTO have the USA with 
its pacific partners on the one, and with the EU on the other side started to introduce a 
‘game-changer’ in the international trading system. Even if it is not clear yet, whether 
those two agreements will actually come into force, the current discussion about who 
will define the regulations for international trade in the 21st century unfold the clashing 
interests of those countries that prefer the current WTO rules as basis, and those who are 
frustrated with the WTO development over the last decades. So far, the BRICS are not 
part of mega-regional trade agreements, but they are actually discussing the possibilities 
of a BRICS free trade agreement between themselves. However, if we look at the BRICS 
joint statements, it is clear, that they are supporting a multilateral trading system, which is 
regulated by the WTO. Furthermore they are reiterating that all future trade agreements 
should be in line with WTO rules, and thereby call for the complementarity of FTAs and 
the WTO [BRICS, 2016]. 
Outside of the above-mentioned summits and joint statements, the results of actual 
trade cooperation are very mixed. The BRICS have definitely over the last decade in-
creased intra-BRICS trade (Fig. 1). Intra-BRICS trade reached in 2013 a peak and is de-
clining since then. This is in line with the recent economic problems in those countries 
However, the BRICS have generally increased their trade not only with other emerging 
economies, but with many partners over the last decade. Out of the value for all accumu-
lated international trade of the BRICS in 2015, only around 12 % is intra-BRICS trade, 
with very different weight for the single countries. For Brazil intra-BRICS trade accounts 
for around 22 % of its overall trade, for South Africa 20 %, for Russia 14.5 %, for India 
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around 14.5 %, and for China around 10 %. Those findings show that intra-BRICS trade 
is important for all BRICS countries, with some vaiation [cf. Mathur et. al., 2013]. At the 
same time is the majority of their trade still with non-BRICS countries. The main trade 
flows happens in the respective region, or with long lasting trading partners. If we look at 
the main trading partners of the BRICS, we see — next to the global trading powers USA 
and EU — countries from the closer region, as for example for China countries as Japan, 
South Korea or Taiwan, or for Brazil the countries Argentina, Mexico or Chile, under the 
top ten trading partners. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of trade from the single BRICS economies towards 
their fellow BRICS partners, and we can observe that trade with China is clearly dominat-
ing. China is for Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa by far the most important BRICS 
trade partner — in general Beijing is the second largest global trading partner for them 
after the EU. But not one of the other BRICS is in the top 10 list of China’s trading part-
ners. China holds on the one side the largest share of intra-BRICS trade, on the other side 
inter-BRICS trade has a rather small share of China’s global trade. Furthermore, for the 
other BRICS the trade with China is much more important, than trade with the remain-
ing BRICS. So while the increasing number of trade between emerging powers is often 
Figure 1. Make an inscription Years (horizontal axis) and Trade, 
bln USD (vertical axis)
S o u r c e: http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx (accessed: 15.03.2017).
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stressed [cf. Mathur et. al., 2013], it is necessary to understand the differences in trade and 
the outstanding role of China, which is not on the same level as its fellow partners.
To summarize, there are five challenges for intra-BRICS and extra-BRICS trade. First-
ly the BRICS need to overcome the ambivalence between their official rhetoric to support 
intra-BRICS trade and their increasing implementation of protectionist measures against 
each other. Secondly is for most BRICS the regional trade integration through their vari-
ous regional frameworks more important than cross-regional BRICS trade. Thirdly are 
mega-regional trade negotiations a challenge for extra-BRICS trade, if they do not par-
ticipate in those and therefore missing out to shape those developments. The fourth chal-
lenge is the heterogeneity in trade between the BRICS as well as in relation towards other 
trading partners. A homogenization of trade would require not only a homogenization 
between the respective customs unions, but also the political will to do so. And finally the 
overweight of trade with China in intra-BRICS trade might cause a challenge, as discussed 
above.
3. Methodology: Cluster Analysis of BRICS Trade
In order to find common foreign trading patterns of emerging economies, this paper 
clusters countries based on trade variables, which show differences and similarities in 
BRICS trade. In comparison with other quantitative methods that are looking for specific 
variables to explain outcomes, cluster analysis groups data by variables into units with 
Figure 2. Distribution of Intra-BRICS Trade in percentage, 2015
Source: http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx (accessed 15.03.2017).
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similar features — and therefore offers for this paper the possibility to understand if the 
current political grouping is also a group in international trade, or not. The method helps 
to organize data in groups with similar variables. These similarity structures are called 
clusters, and those can be labeled after the attributes and features, which are present, or 
not present, in the individual clusters. The first part explains the clustering method of self-
organizing maps, used in this paper, and the clustering process. In the second part follows 
a description of the used data set. And subsequently follows the description of the used 
variables in this analysis.
3.1. Cluster Analysis in the Form of Self-Organizing Maps
Cluster analysis has become an important feature of data mining, the discipline of 
transforming and discovering huge amounts of data. Contrary to classification, where 
data is ordered in already existing systems, cluster analysis identifies new groups of data 
[Abonyi & Feil, 2007]. 
This analysis uses Kohonen-maps or self-organizing maps, an artificial neural net-
work that helps us to show and understand the clusters easily. It is an unsupervised train-
ing set for big data sets, first developed by Teuvo Kohonen in the 1980s [Kohonen, 1995]. 
The Kohonen net is a computationally convenient abstraction building on work on bio-
logically neural models from the 1970s and morphogenesis models dating back to Alan 
Turing in the 1950s.
Self-organizing maps can be used to solve economic problems like modeling, fore-
casting, or pattern-searching in large data sets. The used algorithm represents a specific 
variant of clustering multidimensional vectors. An important feature of the algorithm 
used by the computer program Loginom, which has been used for this analysis, is that all 
parts of the maps (called neurons or nodes) are arranged to one another in a certain struc-
ture. The method uses two steps, namely training and mapping. In a specific training the 
maps are built by the input variables through vector quantization. Here not only the best 
matching unit is modified, but also its neighbors. A matching unit is the node which cor-
respondents with the input variable more closely than all others. Mapping automatically 
classifies a new input vector. Through this a multi-dimensional space can be projected on 
a lower dimensional space, mostly a two-dimensional grid [Loginom, 2008, p. 88]. There-
fore these maps can be considered as a method to project complicated data sets into two-
dimensional groups. The projection is usually located on 2D grips of rectangular or hex-
agonal cells. In this analysis we use hexagonal cells, which are easier to understand due to 
its visualization.The output grids of Kohonen self-organizing maps are useful for finding 
dependencies in the data between variables — but they don’t have specific outputs as for 
example in the case of regression analysis. Rather, this method simply runs new variables 
over pervious variables in order to arrange the cases in a logical order. Out of this order 
we can then label groups or clusters according to the variables values of the nodes in them.
Important to notice here is that the presence of two countries in different clusters does not 
imply the impossibility of trade relations between them, but can deduce highly different 
preferences for trade regulating policies. 
The clustering process in done by the program Loginom. The output of Loginom 
provides us with clusters based on our variables. The output is shown in a map or set of 
nodes, in which each node can be associated with a hexagonal area of the picture. The co-
ordinates of this area are determined by the coordinates of the respective node in the grid. 
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It is important to note that not every hexagon represents a reporting country here, but the 
whole map together presents the pattern of the variables. The resulting map represents an 
atlas which shows the location of the countries, their interconnections, and the relative 
position of the various values of each country. 
In a first step all data is normalized by linear normalization of the initial values. Here 
all variables are transformed in a set from 0–1 or into similar modes dependent of the pro-
gram. The purpose of normalization is to transform the data into the most suitable type 
for the clustering. We then define a training set and the weight coefficient of the neurons. 
The analysis uses eigenvectors in which the weights are initiated using the values of the 
vectors linearly ordered along the linear subspace passing between the two principal vec-
tors of the data set [Loginom, 2008, p. 89]. The resulting maps can be understood as a layer 
cake in which each layer represents a color produced by one of the data set components. If 
we overlap all seven layers of our seven variables we have a final cluster map. The general 
principle is that each variable creates its own clusters, which then run through other vari-
ables to construct common clusters [Loginom, 2008, p. 90].
3.2. The Data set
The idea is to locate the BRICS in a broader scheme of countries, in order to under-
stand their differences as well as their implications for the WTO. Only a broader com-
parison with a large group of countries can show if the BRICS have actually similarities in 
certain areas, and by looking of all member states of the WTO we can draw conclusions 
about effects on the institutions. The used data includes 155 of the 162 WTO members. 
The EU has not been considered as a separate member of the WTO, since the individual 
EU member states’ data is already a part of the sample. Including the EU would thus not 
only lead to an extreme outsider case, but also duplicate data. Furthermore, for six single 
states the data provided by the WTO was not complete, so that they could not be con-
sidered in the calculations. However, these six countries — Chad, Djibouti, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Liechtenstein, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan — are neither emerging economies, nor 
does their exclusion influence the outcome of the analysis significantly. The data is gener-
ated out of the countries’ trade profiles from the WTO Statistical Database and relates in 
98 % to the year 2014 and — due to a lack of current data — only in 2 % of the cases to data 
from the years 2012 or 2013. The used data represents the trade with all trading partners 
in all goods and all services. 
3.3. The Variables
In order to be able to relate the results to the variables, self-organizing maps should 
not include a large number of variables, but rather a short number of reasonable variables 
about the same issue. Therefore this paper uses seven variables, which are all related to 
international trade, as well as to the economic performance of countries. The seven in-
put variables for the cluster analysis are each countries’ (1) exports of all goods, (2) vis-
ible trade balance2, (3) exports of all services, (4) percentage of agricultural products of 
all exports, (5) percentage of fuels and mining products of all exports, (6) percentage of 
manufactured products of all exports, and (7) Most Favorite Nations (MFN) applied tar-
2 The invisible trade balance was not considered in this analysis due to the high correlation between 
imports and exports of services, cf. Annex. 
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iffs on simple average3. Due to the WTO goods’ classification in the WTO Statistical Data 
Base the percentages of variables 4, 5, and 6 do not always end up to 100 %, which makes 
it necessary to include all three variables. The correlation between those three variables is 
not high with the Pearson Correlation between variables 4 and 5 being 0.282 and between 
variables 4 and 6 at 0.367. Only between the variables 5 and 6 we see a higher correlation 
with 0.603, but the value is not high enough to exclude one of the variables. An overview 
of the correlations between all variables can be found in the Annex. In the original data 
set the variables ‘imports of all goods’, ‘nominal GDP4’, and ‘imports of all services’ were 
also present, but have been excluded due to very high correlation of over 0.846, 0.933 and 
0.929 with the variable ‘export’ as well as with the variable ‘service exports’.
The logic behind the chosen variables is to distinguish between the trade perfor-
mances of countries, as well as between their trade compositions. The first three variables 
exports of goods, visible trade balance and export of services are included to reveal the 
general economic performances of countries. The discussions about emerging economies 
points itself already in the direction, that those countries should at least outperform a 
large number of other countries in their economic performance, or even close the ranks 
to developed economies. Here it is interesting, if the clusters show a pattern of emerging 
economies; for example, do they share a pattern in their proportions of exports of goods 
and exports services? Or are there similarities in the trade balances of the BRICS, in rela-
tion to all other included states. Also, trade in services has been recently an important 
topic at the WTO and might also have an implication for future economic rise. 
Trade in agriculture as well as the NAMA negotiations have played a crucial role in 
the Doha Development Agenda and the WTO in the last 15 years, and therefore a differ-
entiation of the main categories of trade in goods appears reasonable. That is why the vari-
ables 4, 5, and 6 are included, in order to differentiate between the domestic backgrounds 
of countries. Exports are a mirror of domestic economies, though especially agricultural 
lobbying and domestic politics sometimes leads to an overrepresentation of certain sectors 
in trade negotiations. Furthermore the main exported good of a country is also related to 
the countries national interest. Resource exporting countries and countries that export 
manufacturing products might have very different interests in regulating the related sec-
tors in international trade negotiations. Furthermore those variables are represented in 
their respective percentages, in order to show their importance for the respective country. 
Thereby those three variables are related to each other, since a higher percentage in one 
of them limits automatically the amount of the other two variables. Finally the inclusion 
of applied tariffs as the seventh variable was then considered to get an estimate about the 
level of protectionism of the respective countries, also in order to understand which of 
the clusters apply higher or lower tariffs. Even if tariffs are today just one measure of pro-
3 This analysis is using simple average applied MFN Tariffs in order to have the maximal amount 
of available data on all case countries. Data for weighted average applied MFN Tariffs is not available for 
all countries for the respective years. However, as can be compared in the WTO statistics website, for the 
BRICS the difference between simple and weighted average tariffs is much smaller than for other countries, 
therefore weighted tariffs would show an even stronger coherence of the BRICS. Furthermore, theoretically 
there is no significant difference between simple and weighted data, if this variable is used as an indicator 
for protection level for a market economy.
4 Nominal GDP compared better than nominal GDP per capita the weights of different economies. 
This analysis is looking at the different between whole economies, and not at differences in the development 
of different countries.
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tectionism, and there are numerous other possible protectionist measures, tariff data as 
a variable for 155 countries are available and transparent, which does not apply for many 
other trade related regulations. And even if today the importance of tariffs might often be 
undermined, as we will see in the results, tariffs still differ highly.
4. Main Findings: BRICS in International Trade Clusters
The following analysis shows the combined multidimensional data of the 155 cases in 
two-dimensional output maps. This general trade cluster map presents the optimal rela-
tionship and grouping of all cases according to the seven variables. The result shows, that 
the 155 cases are best divides in 4 different clusters, which are differentiated from each 
other by specific similarities or differences in the variables. In the following figures we will 
see the general clusters in one map, and then seven maps of the different variables — of 
course the cluster formations and cluster borders in all the variable maps are the same as 
in the general cluster distribution, which is the formation according to all seven variables 
combined. The differences of each variable on the respective seven variable maps are sig-
nalized by different shades of gray, with darker nodes standing for a lower value of the 
respective variable and light nodes standing for higher values. The real amounts are not 
necessary to know for this analysis, only their differences between each other. Further-
more overshadows the normalization of the variables the real values. 
Figure 3 shows the four clusters and the positions of the five BRICS inside, indicated 
by their initials. The first and smallest cluster in the upper right corner includes China and 
six other states: France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Japan, the UK, and the USA. This cluster is la-
beled ‘Economic Leaders’ as will be explained 
later by the variable distribution. The second 
cluster is the largest one with 73 states and is la-
beled ‘Manufacture Exporters’. It also includes 
India and South Africa, though with a huge 
distance between them. The third cluster in the 
lower left corner consists of 38  countries, in-
cluding Brazil, and is labeled ‘Agricultural Ex-
porters’; the fourth cluster includes Russia and 
36 other countries, and is labeled ‘Resource Ex-
porters’. Noteworthy is that Russia has a rather 
small distance to South Africa. A list of each 
countries cluster affiliation is provided in the 
Annex. Regarding the EU countries, we find 
only Greece in cluster 4 and Germany, France 
and the UK in cluster 1, while the other 24 EU 
member states are all in cluster 2 and none of 
them in cluster 3. Other geographical tenden-
cies show South East Asian countries in cluster 
2, Middle Eastern countries in cluster 4, and 
African as well as Latin American countries in 
cluster 3. 
Figure 3. Trade Cluster
Figure 4. Exports
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In order to determine the first cluster we can look at the distributions of the variables 
export, trade balance, and export of services. For the variable exports’ we see in figure 4 a 
strong concentration of higher values (bright nodes) in cluster 1, with China actually as 
the biggest exporter of the world, and lower values (dark nodes) in the three other clus-
ters. Furthermore, we can see that Russia, Brazil and India have significant higher export 
values than their surrounding areas. There is also a concentration of average volumes of 
exports in cluster 2, close to cluster 1, while cluster 3 shows nearly no other high export 
nodes, besides the one around Brazil. In cluster 4 we see around Russia a couple of nodes 
with higher values.
The distribution of nodes in the variable 
trade balance in figure 5 shows a different, but 
related picture. Here cluster 1  includes both, 
the largest as well as the lowest values. China 
and Germany account for the highest surplus-
es, while the USA, the UK, Japan and France — 
together with India in cluster 2 — have the big-
gest negative balances. Furthermore, we see in 
nodes around Russia an accumulation of larger 
values, while South Africa and Brazil show no 
different values as compared to the rest of the 
nodes. This distribution shows in comparison 
with the variable exports, that there might be a 
relationship between a high amount of exports 
and an unbalanced trade balance.
Similar to the distribution of export of 
goods is the one of exports in services, as can 
be seen in figure 6. A clearer picture of cluster 
1 emerges here. Cluster 1 — together with the 
node of India and some other nodes of cluster 
2 which are located around cluster 1 — shows 
the highest values of export in services. We un-
derstand that high exports of goods and high 
exports of services combined constitute cluster 1, as can be seen in a Pearson Correlation 
of 0.797 between both variables5. Russia and Brazil show significant higher values in ex-
port in services in comparison to their clusters, but at the same time significant smaller 
values than cluster 1. Inside of cluster 1 the USA lead in exports in services. So far we can 
observe that cluster 1 countries have significant higher exports and imports6 in goods as 
well as in services; those countries have also either an extreme surplus or deficit in their 
trade balances. The figure also shows that cluster 2 is much closer to cluster 1, while clus-
ter 3 is the farthest away. 
The next three export segmentation variables show the composition of the clusters 
2, 3, and 4. Figure 7 shows us the percentage of agricultural products in the exports. We 
can clearly see the composition of cluster 2, including Brazil, which of the BRICS has the 
largest proportion of agricultural products in its exports. There are even higher values 
5 Cf. Annex.
6 Cf. Annex.
Figure 5. Trade Balance
Figure 6. Service Exports
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in those nodes, which are farthest away from 
cluster 1. We can also observe some medium-
low values of agricultural trade in cluster 2, 
and minor values in cluster 4. However, these 
high values of trade in agriculture explain Bra-
zil’s distance to the other BRICS. 
In figure 8 we see that cluster 4 includes 
mainly all countries with over 50   % of their 
exports in fuels and mining products. Here we 
can find Russia with a high value of around 
70 % its exports in this sector. Also, we see 
some average values in cluster 2  and cluster 
3, especially around Brazil and India, while 
cluster 1 has the lowest values in this variable. 
Interesting is the position of South Africa, be-
ing located close to Russia, due to its on av-
erage higher value as the rest of its cluster. At 
the same time South Africa is far away from 
India, which has a similar value in this vari-
able. However, the distribution in the vari-
ables of Figures 2, 3 and 4, explains very well 
the distance between India and South Africa. 
Furthermore in cluster 3 we see some average 
value nodes around Brazil. 
Figure 9  completes the picture with the 
percentages of manufactured trade. As might 
have been expected, we see high values in the 
nodes of cluster 2, but also of cluster 1 with es-
pecially China leading the high values. South 
Africa and India show average values in this 
variable, which explains their location in clus-
ter 2. Russia and Brazil have lower values, but 
we see why Russia is inside of cluster 4 still lo-
cated close to cluster 2. 
Finally, figure 10  shows the distribu-
tion of the average applied MFN tariffs of all 
WTO member states. Here we can see similar 
tariff values of all BRICS with average to high 
values. China is an outsider in cluster 1, and 
we can see significant higher tariffs in cluster 
3  and cluster  4. Furthermore, Cluster 2  has 
a bisected distribution of the nodes. On the 
one side all 24 EU states of cluster 2 share one 
value, on the other side we can see in the area 
around India an aggregation of higher values. 
Also the BRICS do definitely not belong to 
Figure 7. Agriculture
Figure 8. Fuel & Mining
Figure 9. Manufactures
Figure 10. Applied Tariffs
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low tariff countries. Fig. 10 is the least structured map and does only slightly follow the 
division of the previous variables. But, we can also see some correlations between high 
tariffs and agricultural exports.
The analysis shows that the BRICS are in very different clusters, and those trade 
clusters are mainly defined by the overall size of trade and by the export segmentation after 
commodity group. We can see that each of the BRICS has very district key sectors for their 
national economy, and thereby develop different main interest for trade liberalization or 
protectionism. This might have also been obvious in a simple comparison of the economic 
sectors of the BRICS — however this analysis shows that the BRICS do not just differ 
from each other, but also, that they also do not share many similarities with each other if 
we compare trade variables of 155 countries. Of cause also the other 150 countries differ 
from each other, but in relation to the current discussions of groups and categorization 
of emerging economies, we can see that the BRICS are not a natural convergent group in 
their international trade structure. The used cluster analysis has shown that the BRICS 
are located in four different groups of trade patterns, which illustrates their divergence, 
and helps to assess the future prospects of BRICS trade cooperation. China is here on 
the same cluster as most G7 states, which means a top trading country by the amount of 
trade, a nearly exclusively manufacturing products trading economy, and a large amount 
in trade in services. India and South Africa can be found in the second cluster of rather 
manufactured products trading countries, where India displays higher values in the trade 
of services and South Africa a position closer to the cluster of fuel and mining products 
exporting countries. Russia is located in the cluster of fuel and mining products exporting 
countries and also displays a higher level in trade surplus. Brazil is finally located in the 
cluster of agricultural products exporting countries, and even if Brazil shows higher values 
in the variables exports, manufacturing products as well as fuel and mining products, it is 
still far positioned from the other emerging powers. 
But if we look at the average tariff distribution, the BRICS do share one pattern in 
comparison with other WTO member states: they belong to the countries with higher 
tariffs. This similarity is not strong enough to form with the other variables together an 
own cluster, but we can observe this pattern, which differentiates the 5 BRICS from their 
surrounding clusters. Of cause there are also other countries with higher tariffs, but it is 
clear, that we see here a common pattern of emerging economies. According to Olena 
Sokolovska a relationship between resource exporting counties and higher tariffs exists 
[Sokolovska, 2016, p. 63]. She further argues that for large economies with a significant part 
of resource consumption domestically, as Russia, Brazil and China, tariffs are functioning 
also as a subsidy on domestic consumption in terms of its price and quantity effects.
These highly different patterns will not disappear in the nearer future, even if it might 
be necessary for India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa to increase their share of exporting 
manufacturing products, in order to diversify their in some cases very price dependent 
export patterns. The analysis also shows, that China has much more similarities to the 
G7 than to the other emerging economies. This result, which shows — based on trade 
variables  — a strongly uneven group of emerging economies, points less to a stronger 
trade integration between the BRICS, but reveals the necessity of a rule based multilateral 
trading systems, as the WTO. The mixed structures of the BRICS might thereby even 
strengthen the WTO, an international institution which has been in some struggles in 
recent years.
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This analysis has only used seven specific variables in order to determine the 
BRICS location in the presented clusters. And one main finding is the shared amount 
of comparably high tariffs. Surely further studies with new variables, based on these 
findings could uncover more detailed the differences and similarities in the used trade 
policy instruments. However, those studies need a different composition, since there is 
little comparable data for all WTO member states on specific trade policy instruments. 
Here a simple comparison of used trade policy instruments  — of tariff and non-tariff 
measures — of the BRICS might be an interesting further study. 
Conclusion
This paper asked, if the BRICS share economic interest in global trade, which could 
be the foundation for increasing cooperation between those emerging economies. Is there 
latitude for emerging economies to establish lasting cooperation that might have significant 
effects on international institutions as the WTO, or may different trade patterns hinder 
the establishment of a comprehensive approach? After creating trade clusters in order to 
determine trade patterns, the paper gives two main conclusions to this puzzle. Firstly, the 
analysis shows that the BRICS do not fall in the same clusters if we compare 155 WTO 
member states on our seven trade variables. The BRICS are highly different in their trade 
patterns, especially in their export compositions, and have little similar preferences in their 
direct trade structures. But the BRICS share a higher level of tariffs in comparison with 
other states, which points to an interest in preserving a higher level of protectionism to 
secure their current national interests. This rather protectionist position can be explained 
by the categorization of the BRICS as state-permeated market economies; a categorization 
which argues that governing elites in large emerging economies prefer — contrary to liberal 
market economies — the implementation of rather protectionist trade policies. Since the 
ties between the state and economy are much closer in emerging economies through state-
owned companies and personal relations, protection of these constructs against reforms 
or foreign competition becomes national interest. Those findings therefore also signify 
that the BRICS do not share a common version of trade liberalization, which stands in 
contrast to their public statements on the issue. 
And secondly this paper concludes that the BRICS have a strong interest in preserving 
the WTO in its current status. As said above, the BRICS share not much direct trade 
interests, however they share similar characteristics in the organization of their economies, 
as well as a higher level of applied tariffs. This does not have to imply a more protectionist 
global economy [Schweller, 2015, p. 11], however we can expect that the BRICS will not 
deepen their trade cooperation tremendously in the near future. They might rather rely on 
the multilateral rule based trading system of the WTO. While the BRICS are not pleased 
with the current status of the IMF or World Bank, the WTO provides for the BRICS exactly 
what they require, a rule based system, in which they themselves can influence the speed 
of liberalization and preserve the status quo, in which emerging economies might further 
develop. And here lies the actual potential of BRICS cooperation and coordination in the 
international trading system. By focusing rather on preserving the current system, through 
supporting each other in resisting fast changes and through knowledge exchange in the 
WTO, the BRICS are able to improve their trade cooperation on the basis of the current 
WTO system. Of cause there is also the possibility of establishing bilateral FTSs between 
5-2-2017.indd   298 07.06.2017   11:12:14
Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2017. Т. 33. Вып. 2 299
the single BRICS, however also those would be based on the current WTO system. As an 
open question remains, if their economic form or state-permeated market economies will 
in the long run prove itself as the more sufficient way for economic development. The 
current economic problems in the BRICS could also lead to a change in their economic 
preferences. However, as long as there are such close ties between the business elite, the 
state, and state-owned enterprises, which hinder national reforms due to their individual 
benefits of preserving this status quo, the BRICS will rely on a more protectionist trade 
system as their national preference. 
Finally, this paper has introduced cluster analysis to the current studies about the 
BRICS and the international trading system. Thereby it has opened a new view on the 
BRICS by not just comparing them with each other, or with Western industrial countries, 
but by using a framework which includes nearly all members of the WTO. The method 
itself has thereby shown its potential and limitations. On the one hand the method allows 
to understand the clear distinctions between those emerging economies, on the other hand 
the results open a lot of subsequent questions which could not be addressed in this study. 
In comparison with regression analysis, cluster analysis only allows a limited number of 
variables, in order to be retraceable. However, this first findings in this paper show the 
huge potential of further studies with cluster analysis. For example one could compare 
several clusters based on different groups of variables. Or one could broaden the studies 
in order to take a more detailed look at the single clusters to find theoretical patterns 
and explanations for their composition. Unfortunately does this kind of analysis require a 
huge amount of comparable data, which is not yet available for many specific policies in 
trade — is has already not been possible to find simple export data for all member states of 
the WTO itself. But in general offers the engagement with empirical research in new areas 
as BRICS studies very interesting findings and research possibilities.
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ANNEX
Table 1. WTO member state’s affiliation in the clusters 1–4
Cluster 1 (N 7) 
Economic Leaders
Cluster 2 (N 73) 
Manufacture Exporters
Cluster 3 (N 38) 
Agri. Exporters
Cluster 4 (N 37) 
Resource 
Exporters
China Albania Macao SAR Argentina Angola
France Antigua and Bar. Macedonia Belize Armenia
Germany Austria Malaysia Benin Australia
Hong Kong SAR Bangladesh Malta Brazil Bahrain
Japan Barbados Mauritius Burkina Faso Bolivia
United Kingdom Belgium Mexico Burundi Brunai
USA Botswana Moldova Cabo Verde Cameroon
  Bulgaria Morocco Cen. African Rep. Chile
  Cambodia Nepal Côte d’Ivoire Colombia
  Canada Netherlands Fiji Congo
  Chinese Taipei Pakistan Ghana Cuba
  Costa Rica Panama Grenada Ecuador
  Croatia Philippines Guatemala Gabon
  Cyprus Poland Guinea-Bissau Greece
  Czech Republic Portugal Guyana Guinea
  Denmark Romania Iceland Jamaica
  Dominica St. Kitts & Nevis Kenya Kazakhstan
  Dominican Rep. Saint Lucia Laos Kuwait
  Egypt Samoa Madagascar Mauritania
  El Salvador Singapore Malawi Mongolia
  Estonia Slovakia Maldives Montenegro
  Finland Slovenia Mali Mozambique
  Georgia South Africa Namibia Myanmar
  Haiti Spain New Zealand Niger
  Hondura Sri Lanka Nicaragua Nigeria
  Hungary Swaziland Paraguay Norway
  India Sweden Rwanda Oman
  Indonesia Switzerland St. Vincent Papua New Guinea
  Ireland Thailand Senegal Peru
  Israel The Gambia Seychelles Qatar
  Italy Togo Solomon Islands Russian Federation
  Jordan Tunisia Suriname Saudi Arabia
  Korea, Rep. Of Turkey Tanzania Trinidad and 
Tobago
  Kyrgyzstan Ukraine Tonda United Arab 
Emirates
  Latvia Viet Nam Uganda Venezuela
  Lesotho   Uruguay Yemen
  Lithuania   Vanuatu Zambia
  Luxembourg   Zimbabwe  
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